We consider a decentralized two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product and sells it through a retailer facing a price-dependent demand. We assume that the secondperiod production cost declines linearly in the first-period production, but with a random learning rate. As the mean and/or the standard deviation of the learning rate increase, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain.
Introduction
Many manufacturing firms have production cost reduction over time due to learning from the repetition of their activity associated with cumulative production. This phenomenon is known as learning-by-doing, experience curve, or learning curve, and has been well observed over the last several decades in a number of industries such as aircraft manufacturing, automobile assembly, apparel manufacturing, production of large musical instruments, and semiconductor manufacturing.
Papers on the topic can be categorized as those dealing with empirical evidence, economic theory, and operations management/operations research, and are briefly reviewed in the next section.
Most of the literature in the last category have focused on deriving optimal production decisions for a single manufacturer. In this paper, we examine the role of learning, assumed to be stochastic, in a two-period supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (she) who sells her product through an independent retailer (he) and produces according to the retailer's orders. Also, both the manufacturer and the retailer have market powers to set prices, so that the wholesale and retail demands for the product depend on their pricing strategies and therefore affect the production, procurement, and inventory decisions made in the supply chain. Since the amount of production in the first period may create significant cost reduction in the second period, it becomes important to study the impact of learning on the pricing and procurement decisions of the supply chain members as well as the possibility of achieving channel coordination or the first-best solution.
Both the manufacturer and the retailer are interested in maximizing their respective expected total profits over the two periods subject to a state equation that specifies how the second-period production cost evolves from the first-period production quantity and the stochastic learning rate.
The random second-period production cost is fully observed at the beginning of the second period.
We will solve a number of problems based on our model. Problems in the first set are formulated under the assumption that no inventory can be carried over from the first period to the second.
The second set of problems will allow inventory carry-over.
Without the inventory carry-over option, the problem of the supply chain will be formulated as a dynamic Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the leader deciding the wholesale prices and the retailer as the follower deciding the retail prices or, equivalently, the ordering quantities in each of the two periods. The solution concept that we use is that of feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, which is known to be sub-game perfect. By solving this game as well as the benchmark centralized problem, we can see that the presence of learning increases the severity of the double marginalization. With this in mind, we focus on developing a revenue sharing contract -a commonly used coordinating mechanism -to coordinate the channel. In such a contract, the manufacturer, the supply chain leader, decides the wholesale prices and the revenue-sharing terms, but the retailer must follow by deciding the retail prices as well as the ordering quantities in each of the two periods.
Furthermore, we explore how the learning rate parameters affect the terms of the coordinating contract and the splitting of the total supply chain profit between the channel members.
With the inventory carry-over option, we solve the centralized problem and obtain a coordinating revenue sharing contract. If, in the first-period, the demand determined by the retail price is less than the quantity ordered, then the leftover inventory is carried over to the second period. We find that in the centralized solution, inventories will be carried provided that the holding cost is not too high and the learning rate is not too low, in order to take advantage of unit cost reduction in the second period by producing an excess amount in the first period. Otherwise, no inventories will be carried in the centralized solution even though they are allowed. Furthermore, after developing the coordinating contract, we investigate the impact of the learning rate parameters on terms of the coordinating contracts and the splitting of the total supply chain profit between the channel members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the related literature. Models and assumptions are specified in Section 3. In Section 4, we solve the problems without the inventory option. Section 5 carries out the analysis with the inventory option. Section 6 concludes the paper. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Literature Review
Learning-by-doing is a well known economic concept that refers to the workers' capability to improve their productivity through repeated action. Economists have studied the impacts of spillover learning effects on economic growth, market structure, competitive behavior, capital investment, trade policies, and increasing returns to human capital (Arrow 1962 , Spence 1981 , Fudenberg and Tirole 1983 , Lucas 1988 , and Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1988 . When used in the context of manufac-turing, the concept, also known as the learning curve, explains the decline in the unit production cost with cumulative production. An early work by Wright (1936) found that the direct labor cost fell by 20% with every doubling of cumulative production in the aerospace industry -a learning rate of 80%. Subsequent studies and industry surveys have shown that the learning curve phenomenon exists in various industries (Baloff 1971 , Yelle 1979 , Dutton and Thomas 1984 , and Hatch and Mowery 1998 . All of these works assume deterministic learning rates. Some use an exponential learning curve, while others use a linear learning curve. In particular, Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) specify a linear or piecewise linear learning curve in two-period models, where cost learning takes place in the first period, considered as the infant phase of the industry, and no learning takes place in the second period, interpreted as the mature phase of the industry.
Applications of the learning curve to operations management problems include optimal production planning under uncertainty (Majd and Pindyck 1989 , Mazzola and McCardle 1996 , Mazzola and McCardle 1997 , andÁlvarez and Cerdá 1999 , production and inventory decisions (Jorgensen et. al. 1999) , capacity expansion (Hillier and Shapiro 1986), setup cost learning in lot sizing (Karwan et al. 1988 and Chand and Sethi 1990) . A well known practical application of the learning curve occurs in automobile production at Toyota. The Toyota Production System is known for Kaizen (Japanese for "improvement" or "change for the better"), which is a philosophy that focuses on the continuous improvement of processes, a philosophy explicitly built upon learning-by-doing effects (Shingo 1981) .
Papers involving production cost learning that are closely related to ours are McCardle (1996) andÁlvarez and Cerdá (1999) . Mazzola and McCardle (1996) consider stochastic learning in the context of optimal multi-period production planning. They employ an exponential learning curve with an additive uncertainty, and show that the results with stochastic learning differ from those with deterministic learning -the optimal production exceeds the myopic production in some models -a key result from the deterministic learning literature, while the result does not hold in others. Álvarez and Cerdá (1999) use linear learning and multiplicative uncertainty. This type of uncertainty has the important feature that no learning takes place if there is no production in the first period, whereas a cost reduction is possible in the additive uncertainty model of Mazzola and McCardle (1996) even with zero production in the first period. Our model extends the work ofÁlvarez and Cerdá (1999), carried out in the context of a centralized firm, to a supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer. Moreover, we allow for inventory carry-over that is absent in their work. As for the stochastic learning rate, they model it by a discrete random variable with a positive lower bound on the learning rate, whereas we model it as a continuous random variable with an assumption that guarantees the second-period cost to remain positive. We are particularly interested in the impact of the learning curve on pricing, procurement, and inventory decisions, as well as dynamic channel coordination.
Since our paper involves dynamic channel coordination, we next review related papers on the topic. Although there are a vast number of papers studying supply chain coordination in single period settings, very few papers investigate supply chain coordination in dynamic environments. Lee et al. (2000) and Taylor (2001) study two-period newsvendor models with an exogenous retail price that declines over time. With two buying opportunities, Lee et. al. (2000) show that price protection cannot guarantee channel coordination. Taylor (2001) achieves channel coordination by a combination of price protection and return policies. Linh and Hong (2009) develop a coordinating revenue sharing contract for a two-period newsvendor supply chain with exogenous stochastic demands. Anand et al. (2008) consider a two-period deterministic supply chain and show that two-part tariff contracts fail to achieve the first-best solution. In contrast to these, we consider a two-period supply chain with stochastic learning and price-dependent demands, and achieve coordination by revenue sharing contracts for cases with and without the inventory carry-over option.
Model
We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer (she) produces a product and sells it through a retailer (he) over two periods. Owing to the learning curve effect, the manufacturer's unit production cost declines linearly with accumulated production. Let the random variable Λ, taking value in the interval [0, γ] , denote the stochastic learning rate. Without loss of generality, we assume Λ = γX, where the random variable X has the interval [0, 1] as its support and f (x) as its probability density function (pdf). Let E[X] = µ/γ and V ar(X) = σ 2 /γ 2 , so that the mean and the variance of the learning rate Λ are µ and σ 2 , respectively. With this, the manufacturer's second-period unit production cost is given by the random variable C 2 = c 1 − Λq 1 = c 1 − γXq 1 , where c 1 is her first-period unit production cost and q 1 is her first-period production quantity. C 2 is observed or equivalently, X is realized, at the beginning of the second period. We shall let c 2 and x denote the realizations of C 2 and X, respectively.
Let p 1 and p 2 denote the retail prices in periods 1 and 2, respectively. We assume the ith period demand to be D i (p i ) = a i − bp i , where a i > 0 is the potential market size in period i and b > 0 captures the customers' price sensitivity to the retail price p i , i = 1, 2. Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions regarding the parameter values:
A1 ensures that there are p 1 > c 1 and p 2 > C 2 , almost surely, to rule out a negative demand in each period. In the remainder of the paper, the inequalities involving random variables are understood to be in the almost sure sense. A2 guarantees that the second-period production cost is almost surely positive, since the maximum production in period 1 will never exceed the total two-period market potential a 1 + a 2 . This is an a priori assumption, although we will see later that all we need is the less restrictive condition c 1 − max{a 1 , a 2 }γ > 0 to guarantee that the second-period production cost will remain positive along the optimal path. Furthermore, if there is a lower bound of τ on the second-period production cost as inÁlvarez and Cerdá (1999), then we can change A2 to c 1 − (a 1 + a 2 )γ > τ , and re-solve the problem in the same way. However, we note that all of the insights derived in this paper will remain.
We assume that the supply chain operates in a make-to-order environment: in each period, the manufacturer produces to satisfy the retailer's order, and she does not carry over inventory from the first period to the second. The retailer, on the other hand, could consider carrying inventory if he has an adequate storage facility, such as a warehouse. In Section 4, we study the case in which the retailer does not have the inventory carry-over option, and use the label "without inventory option" to refer to this case. We then examine in Section 5 the case in which the retailer has the inventory carry-over option, and use the label "with inventory option" to refer to this case. In both cases, we assume that the unmet demands are lost, i.e., no backorders are allowed. For ease of exposition, we assume that the retailer has no option to dispose of the unsold items at the end of each period. As we shall discuss later in the paper, even if the retailer has the option to dispose of items at no cost, it is never optimal for him to do so.
We formulate the decentralized problem of the supply chain as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. We assume that both supply chain members are forward-looking (far-sighted) risk-neutral profit maximizers. We seek a feedback Stackelberg solution in which the leader has a period-wise advantage over the follower. This concept of equilibrium is known to be time-consistent (subgame-perfect). On the other hand, global openloop Stackleberg solutions or global close-loop Stackelberg solutions, in both of which the leader has a global advantage over the follower, are not time-consistent. In a global open-loop Stackelberg solution for our game, the manufacturer commits to the wholesale prices in both periods at the beginning of the game, and is studied by Anand et al. (2008) in the special case of our game with no learning (i.e., γ = 0). Global close-loop Stackelberg equilibria, on the other hand, provide feedback strategies that depend on the initial conditions and are often intractable. Feedback Stackelberg solutions can be obtained by using backward recursion, whereas global Stackelberg solutions require the use of the techniques such as the maximum principle and the calculus of variations. For further details on dynamic Stackelberg games and various possible equilibria, the reader is referred to Basar and Olsder (1999) , Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (1979) , and Bensoussan et al. (2012) .
In this paper, our primary focus is on finding the revenue sharing contracts that coordinate the supply chain with or without the inventory option. Without the inventory option, we examine in detail the impact of learning on the double marginalization problem by obtaining the optimal solution of the centralized problem and the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in the decentralized channel. With the inventory option, however, we limit ourselves to solving the centralized problem and finding a channel coordinating contract. This is partly to save space and partly because the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in this case is not explicit.
Without Inventory Option
Without the inventory option, our no-disposal assumption implies that the retailer's order quantity will be the same as the demand in each period, i.e., q i = D i (p i ) = a i − bp i , i = 1, 2. Because of this one-to-one correspondence between the retail price p i and the order quantity q i , it is sufficient to determine only the optimal retail prices p i , i = 1, 2, in the centralized as well as the decentralized channels. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we study the centralized problem and the problem of the decen-tralized channel, respectively. We compare these solutions to analyze the impact of learning on the extent of double marginalization. In Section 4.3, we obtain a dynamic revenue sharing contract to coordinate the channel and examine how the revenue sharing rates affect the coordinating wholesale prices and the splitting of the channel profit between the two players.
Centralized Problem
To establish the benchmark for the decentralized channel and for channel coordination, we solve the problem of the centralized firm in which the manufacturer and the retailer are under the same ownership. In this case, the firm determines the first-period retail price p 1 and the secondperiod retail price policy p 2 (c 2 ), where c 2 is the realization of the second-period production cost, to maximize its expected total profit π, i.e., max
subject to the stochastic state dynamics
We use dynamic programming to solve for the optimal solution. Let C * 2 denote the optimal secondperiod production cost and π * denote the optimal expected profit.
Proposition 1.
Without the inventory option, the centralized channel's optimal first-period retail price p * 1 , the optimal first-period production quantity q * 1 , the optimal second-period retail price policy p * 2 (c 2 ), the optimal second-period production quantity policy q * 2 (c 2 ), the optimal second-period production cost C * 2 , and the optimal expected profit π * are given by:
With assumptions A1 and A2, it can be easily verified that p Remark 1. The results in Proposition 1 were derived under the assumption that disposals are not allowed. However, if the retailer could dispose freely or at some cost, it is easily shown that no disposal would occur in the optimal solution, and Proposition 1 would continue to hold.
We next investigate how the mean and the standard deviation of the learning rate affect the optimal retail prices, production quantities, and profit of the centralized channel. Let π * 1 and
] denote the centralized channel's optimal first-period profit and expected second-period profit, respectively.
Proposition 2. The comparative statics with respect to µ and σ are:
Let us first discuss the effect of an increase in the mean learning rate µ. The immediate effect will be a decrease in the second-period unit production cost C 2 , almost surely, if we are to maintain our first-period production quantity. This suggests an increase in the first-period production quantity in order to take advantage of the increase in µ. The cost advantage in the second period will enable the firm to almost surely lower its second-period price and stimulate the second-period demand.
Without the inventory option, the production quantity in each period is inversely related to the price in that period, which means that the first-period price would decrease and the second-period production quantity would almost surely increase.
We find that the first-period profit decreases in µ and the expected second-period profit increases in µ. This is as should be expected. As the learning rate increases, the production becomes more efficient in the second period. This enables the centralized firm to obtain a higher expected profit in the second period at the expense of the profit in the first period -an intertemporal effect of learning.
The impact of the standard deviation σ of the learning rate on the retail prices, production quantities, and various profits are not so obvious. One may conjecture that the variation in the learning rate may even hurt the profit of the centralized firm. Surprisingly, we find that in the case of no inventory, the centralized firm's optimal expected total profit increases in σ. This is because the centralized firm's optimal total profit is decreasing and convex in the firm's secondperiod production cost. As σ increases, the variation of the firm's second-period production cost increases, which in turn increases the centralized firm's optimal expected total profit. Moreover, we can similarly explain why σ has the same impacts on the prices and the production quantities as µ has.
Decentralized Channel
In the decentralized channel, the manufacturer and the retailer make independent decisions. According to the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium that we seek, the manufacturer, as the game leader, announces her first-period wholesale price w 1 and her second-period wholesale price policy w 2 (c 2 ).
The retailer follows by responding with his first-period retail price p 1 (w 1 ) and second-period retail price policy p 2 (c 2 |w 2 (c 2 )) that maximize his expected total profit given the manufacturer's announcements. Thus, the retailer can use dynamic programming to solve for his optimal feedback response.
The retailer's problem is:
subject to the stochastic state dynamics (2). The optimal solution of problem (3) yields the retailer's response p * 1 (w 1 ) and p * 2 (c 2 |w 2 (c 2 )). The manufacturer anticipates the retailer's reaction functions, incorporates them into her objective function, and solves the following optimization problem by backward recursion:
The backward recursion procedure yields the decisions w * 1 and w * 2 (c 2 ) for the manufacturer.
Using these into the retailer's best response gives us the retail prices p * 1 (w * 1 ) and p * 2 (c 2 |w * 2 (c 2 )), which we write simply as p * 1 and p * 2 (c 2 ) with a slight abuse of notation. We have thus obtained the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium given by the quadruple w * 1 , w * 2 (c 2 ), p * 1 and p * 2 (c 2 ), as specified in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Without the inventory option, the equilibrium feedback Stackelberg solution is as
given below in Table 1 . 
Remark 2. In the decentralized channel, it can be shown that, even if the retailer has the disposal option at no cost or some cost, it is never optimal for him to order more than the demand in the first-period. Therefore, the results in Proposition 3 remain optimal even with a disposal option with nonnegative cost.
We next investigate how the mean and the standard deviation of the learning rate affect the equilibrium retail prices, production quantities, wholesale prices, second-period cost, and profits of the channel and its members. Let π * m , π * r , and π * c = π * m + π * r denote the optimal expected profits of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the channel. 
The effects on the retail prices and the order quantities are similar to those in the centralized channel. Additionally, we find that the first and the second period wholesale prices are decreasing in µ and σ. We know from Proposition 2 that the centralized firm produces more in each period when µ or σ increases. Thus, it is in the interest of the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale prices in order to induce the retailer to buy more in each of the two periods when µ or σ increases.
The expected profits of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the supply chain are all increasing in µ and σ. Contrary to intuition, the manufacturer's (resp. retailer's) portion of the channel profit is decreasing (resp. increasing) in µ and σ.
To facilitate a comparison of the equilibrium solution in the centralized and decentralized channels, we use superscripts "c" to represent the centralized channel and "d" to represent the decentralized channel.
, and
(ii) The comparative statics with respect to µ and σ are:
Not surprisingly, the retailer charges higher prices in each period in the decentralized channel than those in the centralized channel due to the double marginalization effect present even in the absence of learning. Accordingly, the production/order quantities are lower in the decentralized channel. This means that in the presence of learning, there is less learning in the decentralized channel than in the centralized channel. Furthermore, the efficiency loss, i.e., the channel profit
, is increasing in the mean learning rate µ and the standard deviation σ. Thus, increases in µ or σ increase the severity of the double marginalization due to decentralization, thus implying a greater need for channel coordination in the dynamic decentralized supply chain subject to learning. In the next section, we obtain a revenue sharing contract that coordinates the channel.
Coordinating Revenue Sharing Contracts
Suppose the manufacturer and the retailer agree to use a revenue sharing contract at the beginning of period 1. Under such a contract, as the game leader, the manufacturer proposes a quadruple of wholesale prices and revenue sharing rates
where ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are the retailer's portions of the sale revenue in periods 1 and 2, respectively. We limit ourselves to contracts where ϕ 2 is not contingent on the realization of the second-period cost
but they require more information than just the µ and σ of the learning rate distribution to obtain a coordinating contract, and so we omit their analysis in this paper.
As the game follower, the retailer's problem for any given contract {w 1 , ϕ 1 , w 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 }, is:
where q c * 1 is the optimal first-period production quantity in the centralized solution given in Proposition 1.
The optimal solution of the problem yields the retailer's feedback retail price p * 1 (w 1 , ϕ 1 ) and
, ϕ 2 ) in response to the specified contract terms {w 1 , ϕ 1 , w 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 } for any realized c 2 .
The manufacturer anticipates the retailer's reaction functions and tries to coordinate the supply chain by setting the wholesale prices and the revenue sharing rates so that it is optimal for the retailer to choose the retail prices and the order quantities that are the same as the centralized channel's decisions obtained in Section 4.1. In Proposition 6, we obtain a revenue sharing contract that coordinates our two-period dynamic supply chain. 
and w rs 2 (c 2 ) = ϕ 2 c 2 , then {w rs 1 , ϕ 1 , w rs 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 } is a coordinating contract.
Thus, in the case without the inventory option, the retailer's portions of the revenue sharing rates ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 can be arbitrarily selected, and they do not need to be the same in the two periods. This implies that the coordinating revenue sharing contract can arbitrarily split the channel profit between the manufacturer and the retailer, similar to the observation made by Cachon and
Lariviere (2005) From Corollary 1, when the revenue sharing rates are set to be the same for the two periods, the contract terms in each period follow the same structure as the single-period revenue sharing contract (Cachon and Lariviere 2005) .
One implication of Proposition 6 is that the two parties could negotiate over the two revenue sharing rates, giving them additional flexibility to shift the profits between the periods. One may conjecture that in coordination, as the manufacturer offers more favorable sharing rates to the retailer (i.e., as ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 increase), she also raises the wholesale prices w rs 1 and w rs 2 . In other words, does the retailer have to pay higher wholesale prices in exchange for getting a higher portion of the revenue? Will the manufacturer's share of the total channel profit increase as she offers higher revenue sharing rates? How about the retailer's share of the total channel profit? The next proposition provides answers to these questions.
From Proposition 6, we know that a coordinating contract is obtained once we specify the value of the revenue sharing rates ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 . Thus, the manufacturer's expected profit under the contract
with the random unit cost C 2 as defined in (7). Likewise, the retailer's expected total profit can be obtained by substituting p 1 = p * 1 (w rs 1 , ϕ 1 ) and p 2 = p * 2 (C 2 |w rs 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 ) in (6) and taking the expectation with respect to C 2 given by (7):
We can now obtain the following result where we shorten the notation π rs r (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) as π rs r and π rs m (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) as π rs m .
Proposition 7. (i) ∂w rs
The coordinating first-period wholesale price is increasing in the revenue sharing rate in each period, which reflects the balance between the revenue portions and the wholesale price. The second-period wholesale price is independent of ϕ 1 , while it is increasing in the second-period revenue sharing rate ϕ 2 . The relation between the first-period revenue sharing rate and the channel member's profit is monotone: the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit is decreasing (increasing) in the first-period sharing rate. This happens because the first-period revenue sharing rate affects the manufacturer's first-period wholesale price only. The manufacturer is worse off when offering a higher first-period revenue sharing rate.
Generally, there is no monotonic relationship between the second-period revenue sharing rate and the manufacturer's or retailer's profit. One may conjecture that the retailer is better off when he receives a higher portion of the revenue in the second period. We find that this intuition holds in the regular case, in which the second-period market size is medium or large and the first period market size is not very large. However, in the irregular case when the first-period market size is sufficiently large as shown in Figure 1 , the retailer's profit decreases in the second-period revenue sharing rate. This happens because when offering a higher second-period revenue sharing rate, the manufacturer actually raises his wholesale price in each period. Additionally, when the first-period market potential is very large, the retailer's benefit of getting a large portion of the second-period revenue could be seriously reduced by the prices he has to pay to the manufacturer. So the net result is that in the irregular case, the retailer can even be worse off with a higher ϕ 2 . This result can hold only in the presence of learning. If there is no learning, the retailer's profit always increases in the second-period revenue sharing rate. Proposition 7 highlights the importance of the revenue sharing rates. In a dynamic setting, the channel members need to be aware of the intertemporal effects of the revenue sharing rates.
We next investigate the effect of µ and σ on the contract. The second-period wholesale prices decrease monotonically with µ and σ. However, their impact on the first-period wholesale price depend on what the revenue sharing rates are. If the first-period revenue sharing rate is higher than the second-period rate, then the first-period wholesale price is decreasing in µ and σ. Accordingly, the retailer's profit is increasing in µ and σ. The manufacturer's profit can be increasing or decreasing in µ and σ. On the other hand, if the first-period revenue sharing rate is lower than the second-period rate, the manufacturer's first-period wholesale price and her expected total profit are increasing in µ and σ.
With Inventory Option
In this section, we consider the problems in which the retailer has the inventory carry-over option, but not the backlog option. Then, when the retailer's first-period order quantity is greater than the first-period demand, i.e., q 1 ≥ D 1 = a 1 − bp 1 , the leftover units q 1 − D 1 are carried over to the second period with the holding cost of h(≥ 0) per unit. On the other hand, if the retailer's first-period order quantity is less than the first-period demand, then the unmet demand is lost.
Thus, I 2 = max{0, I 1 + q 1 − (a 1 − bp 1 )} denotes the inventory that is carried over to the second period and I 1 in the initial inventory at the beginning of the first period. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the inventory level I 1 is zero.
We first derive the feedback pricing and ordering policies for the centralized channel and examine when it is optimal to carry inventory. Then we examine how the inventory level is affected by the market conditions and the learning rate. Next we focus on the two-period supply chain coordination problem with the inventory option. For this purpose, let us note that we need not study the decentralized channel, and therefore, given that we have performed such a study in Section 4.2 without the inventory option, we choose not to do so here with the inventory option for brevity.
We are able to obtain a revenue sharing contract that can coordinate the dynamic channel consisting of two system states -the unit production cost and the inventory level. To our knowledge, this is the first time a two-period, two-state channel has been coordinated. Finally, we also examine how the revenue sharing rates and learning rate affect the coordinating wholesale prices and the splitting of the profit between the two channel members.
Centralized Channel
To establish the benchmark for the coordinating revenue sharing contract to be obtained in the next subsection, we study the centralized firm first. The firm intends to maximize its expected total profit by determining the first-period retail price p 1 , the first-period production quantity q 1 , the second-period retail price policy p 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), and the second-period production quantity policy q 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), where c 2 is the realization of the second-period production cost and I 2 is the inventory carried over from period 1 to period 2. Mathematically, the problem is
To obtain an optimal feedback solution, we solve the problem by dynamic programming. The solution yields the optimal first-period retail price p * 1 , the optimal first-period production quantity q * 1 , the optimal second-period retail price policy p * 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), and the optimal second-period production quantity policy q * 2 (c 2 , I 2 ). The following result shows that inventory is carried over to the second period only when a certain condition holds.
Proposition 9. With the inventory option, the centralized channel carries over inventory if
(i) When (12) holds, the optimal inventory level I * 2 is given by 
(ii) When (12) According to Proposition 9, inventory will be carried in some situations. But a centralized channel with no gaming involved would carry inventory only for operational considerations. Clearly, without learning, there is no reason for the centralized channel to carry any inventory if there is any cost of holding inventory. We can also see this from (12), when in the absence of learning, γ = 0 implies X = 0 almost surely, making µ = σ = 0 and, therefore,ĥ = 0. Further analysis of (12) reveals that the holding cost thresholdĥ is increasing in the learning rate standard deviation σ. The centralized channel is more likely to carry over inventory when the learning process is more variable (a high σ) because the risk-neutral centralized channel tends to produce more units in the first period when reacting to the variation in learning. The centralized channel is more likely to carry inventory if the second-period market potential a 2 is higher. In the case of zero inventory holding cost, it is financially attractive for the centralized channel to hold inventory.
When inventory is actually carried over, the optimal inventory level I * 2 is decreasing in the firstperiod market size a 1 and increasing in the second-period market size a 2 . When the first-period production cost increases, the centralized channel produces less in the first period and thus has less inventory to carry over to the second period. Naturally, the centralized channel carries over less inventory when the inventory holding cost increases. When the learning variation is high (a high σ), the channel produces more units in the first period, and thus, more leftover units are carried over to the second period. The last statement in Proposition 9(i) is of interest. Generally, the impact of the mean learning rate µ on the optimal inventory I * 2 is undetermined. This seems counterintuitive as one would expect a higher µ to imply a more efficient learning process, and therefore a higher level of carry-over inventory. Indeed, in the case of deterministic learning (σ = 0), the carry-over inventory is increasing in µ. However, when the learning is random, the increasing relationship between the carry-over inventory and the mean learning rate no longer holds, i.e., inventory may increase or decrease in µ, depending on the other parameters such as σ and h. For example and surprisingly, with zero inventory holding cost, the optimal level of inventory carry-over is decreasing in µ. Therefore, it would be of interest to further examine the interplay of µ, σ, and h in determining the impact on the inventory carry-over amount.
Proposition 10. When inventory is carried over in a centralized channel, the comparative stat-
ics of the optimal prices, the second-period production cost, and the profits with respect to µ and σ are as follows:
In the centralized channel with the inventory option, µ and σ affect the retail prices and the second-period production cost in the same way as they do when the inventory option is not present.
The first-period production quantity is increasing in σ. Recall that in the case without the inventory option, the first-period production quantity increases in µ, independent of the relationship between µ and σ. However, when inventory is actually carried, the first-period production quantity increases in µ only when the learning standard deviation σ is not too high relative to µ, i.e., when σ/µ < √ 2.
It can be verified that many distributions including uniform distribution, triangular distribution, exponential distribution, and many other distributions satisfy this property. Like in the case without the inventory option, the centralized firm's optimal expected profit increases in the mean µ and standard deviation σ of the learning rate with the inventory option.
Coordinating Revenue Sharing Contract
Proposition 6 demonstrates that without the inventory option, if the revenue sharing rates and the wholesale prices are properly set, then the channel coordination is achieved in our dynamic setting. With the inventory option, dynamic channel coordination is more difficult to achieve in the decentralized channel as the retailer has an additional decision to make, i.e., how many units to order in the first period, in addition to only the retail price decision in Section 4.1. Anand et al. (2008) show that a two-part tariff contract -a contract with a fixed fee and a wholesale price -fails to achieve coordination in their dynamic setting. In a two-period model, Lee et al. (2001) show that price protection, a mechanism under which the manufacturer pays the retailer a portion of the wholesale price difference for the inventory to be carried over from the first period, cannot guarantee channel coordination. Yet, we are able to obtain a revenue sharing contract that coordinates our two-period supply chain with the inventory option and the presence of learning.
Similar to Section 4.3, suppose the manufacturer and the retailer agree to use a revenue sharing contract at the beginning of the horizon. Under such a contract, the manufacturer as the game leader proposes a quadruple of wholesale prices and revenue sharing rates {w 1 , ϕ 1 , w 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), ϕ 2 }, 0 ≤ ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ≤ 1, to the retailer, where ϕ i is the retailer's portion of the sales revenue in period i = 1, 2. For any given contract {w 1 , ϕ 1 , w 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), ϕ 2 }, the retailer's problem is:
subject to the stochastic state dynamics (11).
The optimal solution of the problem (13) yields the retailer's feedback retail price p * 1 (w 1 , ϕ 1 ), p * 2 (w 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), ϕ 2 ) and the order quantities q * 1 (w 1 , ϕ 1 ), q * 2 (w 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), ϕ 2 ) in response to the specified contract terms {w 1 , ϕ 1 , w 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), ϕ 2 } for any realized c 2 . The manufacturer anticipates the retailer's reaction functions and tries to coordinate the supply chain by setting the wholesale prices and the revenue sharing rates so that it is optimal for the retailer to choose the retail prices and the order quantities that are the same as in the centralized channel.
Note that α > 0 under the assumptions A1 and A2. Let us also recall the definition ofĥ from Proposition 9. It can be verified that when h <ĥ, we have β ≥ 0. We can now state the following results.
Proposition 11. (i) If h <ĥ, then the revenue sharing contract {w rs
, with ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 satisfying the relationship
w rs 1 = ϕ 2 c 1 − (1 − ϕ 2 )h and w rs 2 (c 2 , I 2 ) = ϕ 2 c 2 , coordinates the channel. Furthermore, ϕ 2 > ϕ 1 .
(ii) If h ≥ĥ, then no inventory is carried and the coordinating revenue-sharing contract is the same as that obtained in Proposition 6.
As in Section 4, the manufacturer has four degrees of freedom to specify a revenue sharing contract. When the inventories are carried in equilibrium, she has to equate the three parameters that govern the retailer's behavior (the retail prices in periods 1 and 2 and the inventory level at the beginning of period 2). Thus, the manufacturer has only one degree of freedom left to choose the contract parameters, and she no longer has the flexibility to choose both of the revenue sharing rates arbitrarily; the two rates are interdependent as specified in (14). Recall that without the inventory option, the manufacturer can set the two rates arbitrarily. This implies that with the inventory option, the supply chain members have less flexibility in negotiating over the contract terms. Also, we see from Proposition 11 that the second-period revenue sharing rate has a lower bound and it is required to be greater than or equal to the first-period revenue sharing rate.
Why does the revenue sharing contract of Proposition 11 coordinate the two-period supply chain, but the two-period, two-part tariff contracts fail to do so? Although a two-period, two-part tariff contract also has four contract parameters, they have different impacts on controlling the retailer's behavior. Note that the manufacturer and the retailer share the revenue of each unit that the retailer sells, and therefore the revenue sharing rates enter into the retailer's profit function in a multiplicative fashion. However, the fixed fees in a two-part tariff contract are lump-sum payments to the retailer so they contribute to the retailer's profit as additive terms. When the retailer derives the best response retail prices, the fixed fees do not appear into the retailer's response functions directly and hence they do not directly affect the retailer's response. In contrast, the retailer's response retail prices under a revenue-sharing contract are explicit functions of the sharing rates.
Therefore, the revenue sharing rates work more effectively in governing the retailer's behavior. The degrees of the freedom that a contract provides matter, but more importantly, how the contract parameters influence the retailer's behavior ultimately determines the effectiveness of that contract in coordinating a supply chain.
Next, we examine how the revenue sharing rates affect the wholesale prices and the profits of the two players. Given
, 1] as in Proposition 11, the retailer's expected profit π rs r (ϕ 2 ) under the coordinating contract (w rs 1 , ϕ 2 (1 + β) − β, w rs 2 (c 2 , I 2 ), ϕ 2 ), can be obtained from (13) with
, and q 2 = q * 2 (w rs 2 (C 2 , I 2 ), ϕ 2 ). The manufacturer's expected profit under the coordinating contract can be obtained as follows:
with
Proposition 12. ∂w rs 1 /∂ϕ 2 > 0 and ∂w rs 2 (C * 2 , I * 2 )/∂ϕ 2 > 0. If h = 0, then ∂π rs r /∂ϕ 2 > 0 and
Intuitively, the manufacturer charges higher wholesale prices in response to higher revenue sharing rates to compensate for her revenue loss. As expected, when the holding cost is reasonably low, if the revenue sharing rates increase, the retailer's (resp. manufacturer's) profit increases (resp. decreases). However, when the holding cost is high, this relationship becomes more complicated.
The next proposition investigates the impact of the mean and the standard deviation of the learning rate on the wholesale prices.
Proposition 13. ∂w * 1 /∂µ = 0 and ∂w * 1 /∂σ = 0, ∂w rs 2 (C * 2 , I * 2 )/∂µ < 0, and ∂w rs 2 (C * 2 , I * 2 )/∂σ < 0.
Interestingly, the coordinating first-period wholesale price does not depend on the learning rate. It is determined only by the second-period revenue sharing rate and the holding cost. As the mean or the standard deviation of the learning rate increases, the coordinating second-period wholesale price decreases. This is interesting because a higher learning efficiency may not bring the manufacturer more benefit. However, a more detailed analysis of the comparative statics of the manufacturer's and retailer's profits with respect to the mean and the standard deviation of the learning rate is more complex and thus omitted in this paper.
Conclusion
In a two-period model, we investigate the stochastic learning curve effect in a decentralized supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer has an opportunity to reduce the second-period production cost by gaining production experience in the first-period. The learning rate, at which the production cost is reduced, is random at the beginning of the first period and the outcome of the learning rate is revealed at the beginning of the second period. We study the implications of cost learning on dynamic pricing and procurement policies and dynamic channel coordination. We study cases when inventories are allowed and when inventories are not allowed to be carried over to the second period. In each case, we characterize the optimal decisions for the centralized channel. For brevity, we obtain the equilibrium decision for the decentralized channel only in the case without the inventory option. We compare the results under the centralized channel with those under the decentralized channel in the case without the inventory option. We find that the classical double marginalization problem is even worse, and hence the efficiency of the supply chain is lower, in the presence of learning. We design two-period revenue sharing contracts to restore the inefficiency in the dynamic supply chains with and without the inventory option.
Furthermore, in coordination, the revenue sharing contracts have different structures in the cases with and without the inventory option. When inventories are allowed and are actually carried in equilibrium, the manufacturer has less flexibility in choosing the revenue sharing rates. As a result, a smaller range of wholesale price contracts can coordinate the supply chain with the inventory option than without. In particular, when the holding cost is low enough such that it would be optimal for the centralized channel to exercise the available inventory option, then the manufacturer must offer a higher revenue sharing rate in the second period than in the first period, whereas without the inventory option, the manufacturer has the flexibility of offering equal revenue sharing rates in both periods. In addition, we provide managerial implications of the trade-offs between the revenue sharing rates and the wholesale prices. We examine the impact of learning parameters on the coordinating revenue sharing terms and on the splitting of the total profit between the channel members.
There are a number of directions in which to extend our paper. One possible extension of our two-period learning curve model is to consider a longer horizon. Another extension is to analyze the results under an exponential learning model. However, with both pricing and ordering decisions to make in each period, closed-form solutions are not possible with exponential learning. The demand is deterministic in our model. Future work could extend our stochastic learning model to allow for demand uncertainty. We have assumed that the retailer, and not the manufacturer or both, may carry over inventories. It would be interesting to allow the manufacturer to carry over inventories and find the conditions under which the manufacturer or both supply chain members would hold inventories. Finally, how does the presence of learning affect the strategic inventories used by the retailer as the Stackelberg follower in a decentralized dynamic supply chain. This last topic is the focus of our ongoing research.
Proof of Proposition 3
First we solve the retailer's second-period problem for p * 2 (c 2 ). For any realized c 2 , let π r2 (c 2 ) = (p 2 −w 2 (c 2 ))(a 2 −bp 2 ) denote the retailer's second-period profit. The first-order condition of π r2 (c 2 ) with respect to p 2 yields p * 2 (w 2 (c 2 )) = (a 2 + bw 2 (c 2 ))/2b. With this, we solve the manufacturer's second-period problem. For any realized c 2 , let π m2 (c 2 ) = (w 2 − c 2 )(a 2 − bp * 2 (w 2 )) denote the manufacturer's second-period profit. Substituting p * 2 (w 2 ) = (a 2 +bw 2 )/2b into π m2 (c 2 ) and using the first-order condition with respect to w 2 yields the feedback wholesale price w * 2 (c 2 ) = (a 2 + bc 2 )/2b. Thus, p * 2 (c 2 ) = p * 2 (w * 2 (c 2 )) = (3a 2 + bc 2 )/4b and q * 2 (c 2 ) = a 2 − bp * 2 (c 2 ) = (a 2 − bc 2 )/4. Next we solve the retailer's first-period problem. With w * 2 (c 2 ) and p * 2 (c 2 ), the retailer's problem becomes
Together with the stochastic state dynamics (2), the first-order condition of (17) with respect to p 1 yields the retailer's first-period best response function
With p * 1 (w 1 ), the manufacturer's problem becomes
Together with the stochastic state dynamics (5), the first-order condition of (19) with respect to w 1 yields the manufacturer's optimal first-period wholesale price w * 1 as in Table 1 . We obtain the equilibrium retail price p * 1 by substituting w * 1 into (18). q * 1 is obtained by using q * 1 = a − bp * 1 .
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Let k 2 = 1/[8−b 2 (µ 2 +σ 2 )] and k 3 = 8bµ(24−b 2 (µ 2 +σ 2 ))(a 1 −bc 1 )+3(128−24b 2 σ 2 +b 4 σ 2 (µ 2 + σ 2 ))(a 2 − bc 1 ). Using the equilibrium results from Table 1 and taking the derivatives, we have
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Based on the results in Propositions 1 and 3, we can verify the following relationships:
(ii) With assumptions (A1), (A2) and relations (16), taking the derivatives of the results in (i) with respect to µ and σ gives the results in part (ii) in Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6.
First we solve the retailer's second-period problem for p * 2 (c 2 |w 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 ). For any realized c 2 , let π r2 (c 2 ) = (ϕ 2 p 2 − w 2 (c 2 ))(a 2 − bp 2 ) denote the retailer's second-period profit. The first-order condition of π r2 (c 2 ) with respect to p 2 yields p * 2 (c 2 |w 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 ) = (ϕ 2 a 2 + bw 2 (c 2 ))/2ϕ 2 b. To coordinate the supply chain, we must have p * 2 (c 2 |w rs 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 ) = p * 2 (c 2 ), where p * 2 (c 2 ) is given in Proposition 1. Consequently, w rs 2 (c 2 ) = ϕ 2 c 2 . Next we solve the retailer's first-period problem. With w rs 2 (c 2 ) and p * 2 (c 2 |w 2 (c 2 ), ϕ 2 ), the retailer's problem becomes
Together with the stochastic state dynamics (2), the first-order condition of (20) with respect to p 1 yields the retailer's first-period best response function
To coordinate the supply chain, we must have p * 1 (ϕ 1 , w rs 1 ) = p * 1 , where p * 1 is given in Proposition 1. Consequently, Under such a coordinating revenue sharing contract, the retailer's optimal first-period retail price and order quantity are equal to those in the centralized channel. The channel coordination is achieved in period 1. Thus, the optimal second-period production cost C * 2 is the same as that in the centralized channel. In period 2, if the manufacturer sets w rs 2 (c 2 ) = ϕ 2 c 2 , then the coordination is achieved in period 2 as the retailer's second-period retail price and order quantity are equal to those in the centralized channel.
Proof of Corollary 1.
From Proposition 6, it follows simply from substituting ϕ 1 = ϕ 2 = ϕ into w rs 1 and w rs 2 (c 2 ).
Proof of Proposition 7.
From Proposition 6, it is straightforward to show that ∂w rs 2 (c 2 )/∂ϕ 1 = 0 < 0. . Thus, ∂I * 2 /∂σ > 0. (ii) If (12) does not hold, the centralized channel will not carry over inventory, i.e., I * 2 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 8(i)-(ii).

Proof of Proposition 10.
The derivatives of p 1 * and q * 1 with respect to µ and σ are
If σ/µ ≤ √ 2, then ∂q * 1 /∂µ > 0. It can be verified that many distributions including uniform distribution, triangular distribution, and exponential distribution satisfy this property. Since C * 2 = c 1 − γXq * 1 , p * 2 (C * 2 , I * 2 ) = (a 2 + bC * 2 )/2b, and q * 2 (C * 2 , I * 2 ) = a 2 − bp * 2 (C * 2 , I * 2 ) − I * 2 , the other results and ϕ 1 = ϕ 2 − (1 − ϕ 2 )β.
Under such a coordinating revenue sharing contract, the retailer's optimal first-period retail price and order quantity are equal to those in the centralized channel. The channel coordination is achieved in period 1. Thus, the optimal second-period production cost C * 2 is the same as that in the centralized channel. In period 2, if the manufacturer sets w rs 2 (c 2 , I 2 ) = ϕ 2 c 2 , then the coordination is achieved in period 2 as the retailer's second-period retail price and order quantity are equal to those in the centralized channel.
Since β ≥ 0, we have ϕ 2 ≥ ϕ 1 .
